Teacher Collective Bargaining and Student Achievement

A Note in the March issue of the Yale Law Journal uses an unusual legal situation in New Mexico to draw conclusions about how teacher collective bargaining affects student achievement. In 1999, a six-year-old New Mexico law requiring schools districts to bargain collectively with a recognized teachers’ union expired. The New Mexico legislature reinstated the law in 2003. As a result, between 1999 and 2003, school districts could refuse to bargain with teachers’ unions.

Based on comparative data for the years when mandatory bargaining was in effect and when it was not, the author concludes that:

• Mandatory teacher collective bargaining laws increase SAT scores, decrease graduation rates, and have no effect on per-pupil expenditures.
• The effects are large and have big financial implications.
• Although teacher collective bargaining laws improve student performance, the improvement comes at the expense of lower-performing students.

The author advances several possible reasons for these effects and also summarizes state teacher bargaining laws, arguments for and against teacher bargaining, and the methodological shortcomings of previous research on the subject.

  Benjamin A. Lindy, “The Impact of Teacher Collective Bargaining on Student Achievement: Evidence from a New Mexico Natural Experiment,” 120 Yale L. J. 1130 (2011).